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BOOK REVIEWS
Perhaps, more than anything else, this reviewer objects to the vantage ground of the author. The Fifth Amendment provision is examined
only from an evidentiary view: is the withheld information reliable, probative material? If so, the witness should be compelled to answer.
When the question does not ask for information the author deems crucial,
as in the situation of the Congressional committee witness, the use of the
Fifth Amendment is permissible. The author says nothing about the
broader concepts and purposes of the Fifth Amendment, i.e. as part of a
total and unified Bill of Rights designed to protect unpopular minorities
from oppressive majorities. As stated by Mr. Justice Black; the founders
of our federal government "were not satisfied that the First Amendment
would make this right sufficiently secure. As they well kiiew, history
teaches that attempted exercises of the freedoms of religion, speech, press,
and assembly have been the commonest occasions for oppression and persecutions. Inevitably such persecutions have involved secret arrests, unlawful detentions, forced confessions, secret trials, and arbitrary. punishments under oppressive laws. Therefore it is not surprising that the men
behind the First Amendment also insisted upon the Fifth, Sixth, and
Eighth Amendments. If occasionally these safeguards worked to the
advantage of an ordinary criminal, that was a price they were willing to
pay for the freedom they cherished."' 2
This reviewer has been somewhat lengthy in his criticism because
the book generally has been hailed favorably as a valuable contribution
to the learning on the Fifth Amendment. But this reviewer deems the
book the work of a scholarly advocate, rather than of a scholar, and an
advocate, moreover, whose partisanship blinds him to important considerations.
DANIEL

H. POLLITTt

EVIDENCE OF GUILT: RESTRICTIONS UPON ITS DISCOVERY OR COM-

PULSORY DISCLOSURE. By John MacArthur Maguire.
Brown and Company, 1959. Pp. xi, 295. $12.50.

Boston: Little,

The appearance of a book by Professor Maguire must always be an
occasion for throwing of hats into the air, and the present book is no
exception. All who remember Evidence: Commoin Sense and Common
12. Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 501-2 (1944).
t Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
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Law1 for its scholarship, good sense, question raising, and happy phraseology will know what to look for in Professor Maguire's new volume,
and they will not be disappointed. The uninitiated had better get busy.
The book is a critical, penetrating, imaginative, and provocative examination, on a comparative basis, of the great civil liberties-evidence
axis of the privilege against self-incrimination, involuntary confessions,
the McNabb-Mallory rule,2 and illegally obtained evidence. In a chapter
entitled Protection of Individuals and Other Persons Against Official
1disconduct, the author dealt with these matters in the earlier book. However, any notion that the book is merely a Readers Digest condensation in
reverse should be dissipated at once by the ten-fold increase in coverage
and by the intervention of 12 years' development in perhaps the fastest
growing field of the law. This is no rehash. Still, it is interesting to
turn back to the earlier chapter after reading the matured product.
The comparative approach is effectively presented not only by parallel treatment, where appropriate, but also by ingenious utilization of similar section numbering under the various topics. Thus, under the privilege
against self-incrimination § 2.03 (page 14) deals with "Types of proceedings in which privilege against self-incrimination is effective, and
types of liability which permit its invocation," under involuntary confessions § 3.03 (page 109) deals with "Types of proceedings, liability, and
disclosure as to which the exclusion of involuntary confessions doctrine
is effective, and persons whom it protects," and under illegally obtained
evidence § 5.03 (page 179) deals with "Types of proceedings in which
the rule excluding illegally obtained evidence is effective, and types of
liability and utilization of evidence which permit its invocation." In like
parallel fashion the reasons for each of the protective doctrines, as well
as the evidentiary consequences of violation are explored. Sections dealing with aspects which depart from the common thread are numbered and
arranged accordingly. Consistencies and inconsistencies are explored,
not only with rare perception but in a manner easily followed by the
reader.
Traditionally an introduction is written last, although placed in the
front of the book. Professor Maguire's introduction, by that label, is
devoted merely to an explanation of the organization of the book. The
grand design and purpose are set forth in the concluding chapter. The
1. (1947).

2. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) ; Mallory v. United States, 354
U.S. 449 (1957).
3. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW, 102 (1947).
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reader might be well advised to turn to it first and then to peruse it again
in the sequence contemplated by-the author.
Few books convey a greater sense of awareness of the on-going nature of the law. Never one to say, "This is the law'," Piofessor Maguire
rather says, "Here is what has happened. Here are'some things to think
about. Where do we go from here?" As a result, important current developments-which -have taken -place-between-the preparation of his manuscript and the writing of this review fit easily and naturally into the picture. For example, in treating the troublesome problem of "standing"
to object to or move to suppress unlawfully siezed contraband, the Supreme Court4 has followed Professor Maguire's lead in noting the inconsistency in the position of the accused charged with possession, but attaching greater weight to the inconsistent attitudes of the prosecutor who
relies upon non-possession to justify seizure but upon possession to establish guilt, thus solving the "braintwister" posed at page 217. Again, the
repudiation of the "silver platter" doctrine,' which rendered admissible in
federal courts evidence unlawfully seized by independently acting state
officers, fits readily into the text treatment at pages 210-211, where
repudiation is foreshadowed.
Professor Maguire is a master question-raiser. It would, of course,
be unreasonable to expect an answer to be furnished to every question.
After all, the law is not a spectator sport. Nevertheless, on occasion the
reader may be justified in some small sense of frustration at being denied
the benefit of the author's thinking in a particular area where the clues
are somewhat less than adequate. Thus the Shapiro6 dilemma of squaring compulsory production of required records with the privilege against
self-incrimination, while thoughtfully explored at pages 102-104, is left
relatively intact and untouched. How does Professor Maguire really
feel about it?
Again one might wish that more emphasis had been placed on Spano
v. New York7 as alleviating the discomfort produced in lovers of civil liberties by Stein v. New York, ' which seemed to permit the actuality of
whether a confession was involuntary, but nevertheless considered, to be
screened behind the impenetrable surface of a general verdict. (See pages
151-152.)
These criticisms are modest to the point of being captious, mere concessions to the reviewer's art. They cannot detract from the stature of
4.
5.
6.
7.

Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
360 U.S. 315 (1959).

S. 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
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this fine, provocative, and stimulating book, which is essential reading
for all, students, teachers, judges, and practitioners who are interested in
the problems of evidence and civil liberties. Professor Maguire's emeritus
status has not seduced him from productivity, as is evident, and we will
expect more from him.
EDWARD W.
t Professor of Law, tUniversity of Illinois.
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